Why cybersecurity tools alone are not enough, find it out in this articel. Many companies genuinely believe they are approaching cybersecurity in a structured and responsible way. Security software is in place, policies exist, and basic awareness of cyber risks has been established across the organization. From a management perspective, this creates a sense of control. The assumption is that the essential measures have been implemented and that serious incidents are therefore unlikely.
And yet, cyber incidents continue to occur with remarkable consistency — not only in poorly prepared environments, but also in companies that consider themselves well protected. This contradiction is not accidental. It reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of where cybersecurity actually begins. Cybersecurity does not start with software. It starts with understanding.
Understanding how systems are connected, how access is granted and maintained, and how everyday work really happens inside the organization. Many security measures are designed around theoretical models: clearly defined responsibilities, predictable user behavior, complete visibility, and sufficient time to react. In reality, organizations operate under constant pressure, with informal processes, legacy systems, overlapping access rights, and decisions made quickly to keep business running.
Attackers are highly aware of this gap. They do not rely on breaking security controls in isolation, but on exploiting the difference between how security is supposed to work and how it actually works in daily operations. As a result, organizations may appear secure on paper while remaining vulnerable in practice.
In the previous parts of this series, we examined why modern cyberattacks are successful and how they typically begin — quietly, gradually, and hidden within normal business activity. In this part, we take a step further back. We focus on why security efforts often fail before a single tool is deployed.
Core insight of Part 4
Cybersecurity efforts rarely fail because organizations lack security tools. In many cases, the opposite is true. Multiple solutions are deployed, dashboards are active, alerts are generated, and reports show that controls are in place. From a technical standpoint, security exists and appears to function. The real issue lies earlier in the process.
Security initiatives often start with solutions instead of questions. Tools are selected before there is a clear understanding of what needs to be protected, how systems are actually used, and where real exposure exists. As a result, security controls are implemented without a solid picture of the environment they are meant to defend.
Understanding is frequently assumed rather than verified. Asset inventories are incomplete. Access rights have grown organically over years. Dependencies between systems are only partially known. Third-party connections exist without clear ownership. In such environments, security tools operate with limited context. They enforce rules, but those rules are based on assumptions, not reality.
This leads to a subtle but critical problem. Security may appear comprehensive while remaining fragmented. Controls monitor isolated components instead of real attack paths. Alerts are generated, but it is unclear which events truly matter. Decisions are made based on tool output rather than on an understanding of business impact.
Attackers benefit directly from this lack of clarity. They do not need to defeat security systems outright. They take advantage of uncertainty, incomplete visibility, and misunderstood relationships between systems and people. When organizations do not fully understand their own environment, attackers effectively explore it for them.
Without understanding, adding more tools does not reduce risk. It increases complexity. Security becomes harder to manage, harder to interpret, and further removed from daily operations. Protection turns into an accumulation of controls rather than a coherent strategy. Cybersecurity only becomes effective when understanding comes first — when organizations clearly see what exists, how it is used, and where failure would truly matter. Only then can security measures be aligned with reality instead of assumptions.
1. Security tools are deployed — but the environment remains unclear
In many companies, security tools are implemented before there is a clear understanding of the environment they are meant to protect. Firewalls, endpoint protection, email security, and monitoring solutions are introduced step by step, often in response to external requirements or perceived risks. Each tool serves a purpose, but they are frequently deployed without a complete picture of how systems, users, and data are actually connected.
Asset inventories are incomplete or outdated. Access rights have grown organically over time. Third-party connections exist without clear documentation or ownership. In this situation, security tools operate with limited context. They enforce rules, but those rules are based on assumptions rather than verified knowledge.
As a result, organizations may believe they have strong coverage, while large parts of their environment remain poorly understood. Security exists, but it is built on partial visibility. What is not clearly known cannot be reliably protected. Without understanding the environment first, even well-configured tools operate in the dark.
2. Assumptions replace understanding
Security planning often relies on assumptions instead of observation. It assumes that systems are used as intended, that access follows documented processes, and that responsibilities are clearly defined. These assumptions simplify decision-making, but they rarely reflect reality.
In daily operations, systems are repurposed, temporary access becomes permanent, and informal workflows develop to keep business moving. These changes are rarely malicious. They are practical responses to pressure and complexity. Over time, however, the gap between documented security models and real usage widens.
When understanding is replaced by assumptions, security controls lose relevance. They protect an idealized version of the organization rather than the one that actually exists. Attackers exploit this difference. They look for what is undocumented, overlooked, or taken for granted. Where organizations assume stability, attackers find opportunity.
3. Visibility is mistaken for insight
Many organizations believe they understand their environment because they collect large amounts of data. Logs are generated, dashboards are filled, and alerts are produced. This creates a sense of visibility. But visibility is not the same as understanding.
Data without context does not explain behavior. Alerts without knowledge of business processes do not explain impact. A spike in activity may be harmless or critical, depending on who is involved, what system is affected, and what role it plays in daily operations.
Without understanding how technical signals relate to real work, security teams are forced to react mechanically. They respond to symptoms instead of causes. Attackers benefit from this limitation. They operate within normal patterns, knowing that activity without context is unlikely to be questioned. Visibility alone creates noise. Understanding turns signals into insight.
4. The risk of believing understanding already exists
One of the most subtle risks in cybersecurity is the belief that understanding is already sufficient. When systems have been running for years and no major incidents have occurred, familiarity is mistaken for clarity. “We know our environment” becomes an unchallenged assumption. Over time, this confidence reduces curiosity. Changes are no longer examined closely. Access reviews become routine. Questions are replaced by checklists. The environment continues to evolve, but understanding remains static. Attackers thrive in this gap.
They take advantage of outdated mental models and unexamined trust relationships. The organization feels informed, but its understanding no longer matches reality. When this illusion is finally broken, it is usually during an incident — when decisions must be made quickly, with incomplete knowledge. Cybersecurity does not fail because organizations lack tools. It fails when understanding stops evolving. As long as protection is built on assumed knowledge instead of continuously renewed insight, security remains fragile, regardless of how many controls are in place.
Security misconception of the week
“We are not an interesting target.”
This belief is widespread — and dangerously misleading. Many companies assume that cyberattacks primarily target large corporations, global brands, or companies with obvious financial or political relevance. Smaller firms, regional businesses, or specialized organizations often see themselves as unlikely targets. The assumption is simple: there is nothing worth attacking. Recent events show how wrong this assumption is.
Just yesterday, a Swiss company became the latest example of this misconception. It was not a global tech giant, not a household name, and not an organization operating in a high-risk industry. Yet it was targeted successfully. Not because it was special — but because it was reachable. Like thousands of other companies, it relied on normal business systems, trusted processes, and the assumption that “this probably won’t happen to us.”
This is a crucial point many organizations miss:
Cyberattacks are rarely personal. They are opportunistic.
Attackers do not start by asking whether a company is important. They ask whether it is accessible, predictable, and insufficiently understood by its own operators. Automated scanning, credential harvesting, and phishing campaigns do not discriminate by size or reputation. They scale across entire regions and industries, looking for weak signals and unexamined assumptions.
The danger lies in the mindset that security relevance must be earned. In reality, every connected organization is already part of the attack surface. The moment systems are online, emails are exchanged, and access is granted, exposure exists. The question is not if a company is interesting enough to be attacked, but whether it understands where and how it is exposed.
The Swiss case illustrates this clearly. The issue was not a lack of tools, nor an absence of basic security measures. The problem was a gap in understanding: assumptions about who would attack, how attacks happen, and what “being secure enough” actually means. These assumptions create blind spots — and blind spots are exactly where attackers operate. Believing that a company is too small, too local, or too uninteresting to be targeted does not reduce risk. It increases it. Because it delays questions that should be asked early:
What would an attacker see first?
Which access paths exist without clear ownership?
Which systems are assumed to be safe simply because they have always worked?
Cybersecurity begins when these questions replace comforting assumptions. Until then, organizations may feel protected — while remaining exposed.
This pattern is not theoretical. It becomes visible when overlooked systems quietly turn into attack paths — as shown in The attack no one expected: How old IT devices almost destroyed a Swiss company.
Cybernews in February
Case 1 – Cyberattack on Senegal’s identity authority disrupts critical services
A recent cyber incident targeting Senegal’s Direction de l’Automatisation des Fichiers (DAF) has led to a temporary suspension of essential identity services across the country. The DAF is responsible for managing national identity cards, passports, biometric records, and voter registration data. Following the detection of the incident, operations were halted, leaving millions of citizens facing delays in accessing fundamental identification services.
According to an official statement, the production of national ID cards was suspended as a precautionary measure. Authorities stated that no personal data had been compromised and that systems were in the process of being restored. However, as the DAF’s online services remain unavailable, public uncertainty continues to grow.
Cyber incidents affecting identity authorities cannot be treated as routine technical disruptions. Institutions that handle biometric and identity data form a critical pillar of national infrastructure. Even short-term outages can have wide-reaching consequences — from delayed access to public services to erosion of trust in state systems.
This case highlights a recurring challenge in cybersecurity: reassurance alone is not enough. When organizations responsible for highly sensitive data go offline, transparency and clarity become as important as technical recovery. The longer systems remain unavailable, the more difficult it becomes to maintain confidence, regardless of whether data loss is officially confirmed.
The incident in Senegal underscores the strategic importance of protecting identity infrastructure — not only from data breaches, but also from operational disruption. Cybersecurity in this context is not just about preventing theft, but about ensuring continuity, credibility, and public trust in digital governance. Source: https://thecyberexpress.com/senegal-cyberattack
Case 2 – APT28 exploits recently patched Microsoft Office vulnerability
Security researchers from Zscaler have linked ongoing attack activity to the threat group APT28, also known as Fancy Bear or Sofacy. The group is exploiting a security vulnerability in Microsoft Office for which a patch was released only recently.
According to the analysis published by Zscaler, the attacks began shortly after the vulnerability became publicly known. This timing is significant. It illustrates how quickly advanced threat actors adapt once technical details are available — often targeting organizations that have not yet applied updates or completed patch rollouts.
APT28 is widely associated with the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and has a long history of cyber espionage campaigns. Previous operations have focused on political institutions, government agencies, and strategic targets across Europe, including organizations in Germany.
This case highlights a recurring and often underestimated risk: the exposure window between patch release and patch deployment. Even when security updates are available, real-world constraints such as testing cycles, operational dependencies, and limited resources can delay implementation. Advanced attackers actively exploit this gap, knowing that many environments remain vulnerable during this period.
The use of widely deployed software such as Microsoft Office further increases the impact. Phishing emails or malicious documents exploiting newly disclosed vulnerabilities blend easily into normal business communication. From a user’s perspective, the activity appears legitimate. From a defensive standpoint, detection becomes difficult once trusted tools and valid workflows are abused.
This incident reinforces a critical lesson for organizations: patch management is not only a technical task, but a strategic risk decision. Delays are sometimes unavoidable, but they must be understood, monitored, and mitigated. For state-linked threat actors like APT28, speed and predictability are key advantages — and unpatched systems provide exactly that.
Case 3- FCC warns of rising cyberattacks on U.S. communication networks
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has issued a high-level cybersecurity warning, urging telecommunications providers across the United States to strengthen their defenses in response to a sharp increase in attacks targeting communication infrastructure. This alert follows analysis showing that ransomware incidents against communication networks have roughly quadrupled between 2022 and 2025, particularly affecting small and mid-sized providers.
Rather than mandating regulations, the FCC’s advisory promotes voluntary guidelines grounded in cybersecurity best practices, including multi-factor authentication, network segmentation, regular patching, and offline backups. These measures aim to reduce the risk of ransomware and other disruptive attacks on critical network functions.
The commission explicitly highlighted the potential consequences of compromised communication systems — from service outages and data exposure to broader impacts on public safety and national security. The warning underscores that vulnerabilities in telecommunications infrastructure can have far-reaching implications beyond individual businesses, affecting emergency communications and essential services across communities.
For sector operators, the message is clear: cybersecurity must be integrated into everyday operational risk management, not treated as an afterthought. The advisory reflects a growing recognition among regulators that reliance on legacy systems and uncoordinated security practices can leave even critical infrastructure exposed. Strengthening resilience in this sector is not only a technical effort, but a strategic commitment to continuity, trust, and national stability. Source: https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/fcc-telecommunications-ransomware-warning/811100
Case 4- Teenagers allegedly collected $115 million in ransomware extortion
British authorities have reported a striking ransomware case in which a group of teenagers is believed to have extorted approximately $115 million through ransomware campaigns. According to investigative reporting, the attacks are attributed to a loosely organized group of young individuals who targeted multiple organizations using data-encrypting malware.
Ransomware — malicious software that encrypts data and demands payment for its release — has long been a central element of cybercrime. What makes this case particularly notable is not the technique itself, but the age of the alleged perpetrators and the scale of the financial impact. Rather than experienced criminal networks, the operation is linked to individuals still in their teens, highlighting how high-impact cybercrime is no longer limited to traditional threat actors.
The reported $115 million figure underlines two important developments.
First, the economics of ransomware have escalated significantly. Even organizations that do not consider themselves high-value targets can face severe financial pressure if attackers identify exploitable weaknesses or operational dependencies.
Second, the barrier to entry for cybercrime has dropped. Readily available toolkits, ransomware-as-a-service models, and online communities allow individuals with limited technical background to execute attacks that previously required structured criminal organizations.
Ransomware remains effective not only because of its technical mechanisms, but because it directly links operational disruption with financial extortion. Targeted organizations are often forced into difficult decisions: pay to restore operations quickly, or accept prolonged outages, reputational damage, and potential data loss. The involvement of younger individuals in large-scale extortion illustrates that the underlying drivers — financial incentives, accessible tooling, and asymmetric impact — are systemic rather than exceptional.
This case reinforces a broader insight for defenders: ransomware is not exclusively the domain of highly sophisticated or state-linked groups. It can emerge wherever opportunity meets capability. Effective risk mitigation therefore depends not only on patching and backup strategies, but on understanding the incentive structures and threat dynamics that allow ransomware operations to scale. German Source: https://www.golem.de/news/mit-ransomware-teenager-sollen-115-millionen-us-dollar-erbeutet-haben-2509-200260.html
Insight of the Month — February
The recent incident involving a Swiss company offers a useful reminder of a reality that is often underestimated. The organization was not operating in a high-profile industry, nor was it widely known outside its immediate market. From the outside, it appeared to be a typical, well-run company with established processes and standard security measures in place.
What makes this case relevant is not the technical detail of the attack, but the underlying pattern. The incident did not occur because security was completely missing. It occurred because exposure existed where it was not actively understood. Systems were connected in ways that had become normal over time. Access paths had evolved with daily operations. Trust relationships existed because they were convenient and had never caused problems before. This is characteristic of many organizations.
Cyber risk does not suddenly appear. It accumulates quietly as environments grow more complex and familiarity replaces scrutiny. When systems work reliably for years, assumptions harden into beliefs. “We know how things work here.” “This setup has always been fine.” “We would notice if something was wrong.” The Swiss case shows how fragile these beliefs can be.
The key insight is not that attacks are becoming more sophisticated, but that organizational understanding often lags behind organizational change. Security measures may still reflect an environment that no longer exists. Access rights reflect past roles. Monitoring reflects outdated priorities. Understanding remains static while reality moves on.
February’s lesson is therefore simple, but uncomfortable:
Being well-organized is not the same as being well-understood.
Cybersecurity matures when companies regularly challenge their own assumptions — about their exposure, their dependencies, and their relevance as a target. Not because something has gone wrong, but precisely because nothing has gone wrong yet. The Swiss incident did not reveal a lack of effort. It revealed a lack of continuous understanding. And that gap is where modern cyber risk quietly takes shape.
Conclusion: Why cybersecurity tools alone are not enough
Cybersecurity tools are not the problem. In many organizations, they are carefully selected, professionally deployed, and technically sound. Firewalls, endpoint protection, monitoring systems, and access controls all play an important role. But tools, by themselves, do not create security. What ultimately determines security outcomes is not the number of controls in place, but the level of understanding behind them. Without a clear and continuously updated understanding of the environment — systems, access paths, workflows, dependencies, and human behavior — security tools operate on assumptions rather than reality. They enforce rules, but they do not question whether those rules still make sense.
This is why organizations can appear well protected and still be compromised. Security tools tend to protect infrastructure as it is documented, not as it is actually used. They reflect yesterday’s environment, yesterday’s processes, and yesterday’s risk models. Attackers, on the other hand, work with what exists today. They exploit blind spots created by complexity, familiarity, and unchallenged assumptions.
The lesson is not to abandon tools, but to reposition them. Cybersecurity tools are most effective when they are the result of understanding, not a substitute for it. They must be guided by clarity about what truly matters to the business, how work really happens, and where exposure evolves over time.
Cybersecurity begins when organizations stop asking, “Which tool should we add next?” and start asking, “Do we truly understand our environment right now?” As long as understanding comes second, tools will continue to provide reassurance rather than protection. This is why cybersecurity tools alone are not enough — and why sustainable security always starts with understanding.
Also take a look at the last 3 parts
Why cyberattacks are successful: Understanding the real causes (Part 1 of 4)
This is how modern cyberattacks really begin – a look behind the scenes (Part 2 of 4)
Why Existing Security Measures Fail Where It Matters Most (Part 3 of 4)
